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The Path Dependence of Organizational Reputation: 
How Social Judgment Influences Assessments of Capability and Character 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing upon theory on social judgments and impression formation from social psychology, 
this paper explores the socio-cognitive processes that shape the formation of favorable and 
unfavorable organizational reputations. Specifically, we suggest that stakeholders make distinctions 
between an organization’s capabilities and its character. We explain the nature and function of each 
and articulate the manner in which judgment heuristics and biases manifest in the development of 
capability and character reputations. In doing so, this research explores both the positive and 
negative sides of organizational reputation by examining the manner in which different types of 
reputations are built or damaged, and how these processes influence the ability of managers to 
enhance and protect these reputations. 
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In the past two decades, there has been considerable scholarly interest in the topic of firm 
reputation (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rindova et al., 2005; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). This 
research has significantly expanded our understanding of what constitutes an organizational 
reputation and the host of benefits that may result from enjoying a favorable reputation (e.g., 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rindova, Petkova, and Kotha, 2007; Rindova et al., 2005). However, we 
still know relatively little about how stakeholders make these reputational judgments about an 
organization or how such judgments might be adjusted in light of new information. Specifically, 
scholars are just beginning to examine these socio-cognitive processes—the social judgments 
through which stakeholders translate information about an organization into a particular reputation 
(Love and Kraatz, 2009). Given the impact of heuristics and biases on the judgments and decision-
making of both individuals (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and organizations (e.g., Carpenter, 
Pollock and Leary, 2003; Mishina et al., 2010), it stands to reason that these biases may also shape the 
manner in which organizational reputations form and change.  
Examining the socio-cognitive processes involved in the formation and revision of 
organizational reputations is important for at least three reasons. First, in the absence of perfect 
information about a firm’s characteristics and future behavior, stakeholders use its reputations as a 
proxy in order to make decisions. However, there can often be gaps between a firm’s reputation and 
its objective characteristics. We can begin to uncover when and how these gaps may occur and 
persist by delineating why evaluators focus, and place greater credence, on certain cues1 while 
ignoring or downplaying others. Second, this approach can provide unique insights into how firms 
can better build and manage their reputations. Finally, delving into these socio-cognitive processes 
                                                 
1 A cue is defined as something that is considered by the evaluator to be potentially informative, which may include direct 
and vicarious observation of organizational actions, reactions, statements, characteristics, and outcomes. What 
constitutes a cue is beyond the scope of this paper, but is likely to be both stakeholder-specific and dependent on 
existing assessments.  
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allows us to distinguish between the two primary types of reputations stakeholders use, and assess 
the benefits and detriments that each can create in a particular situation.  
This paper draws upon social judgment and impression formation theories from social 
psychology to explore the socio-cognitive processes that shape the formation of organizational 
reputations. In doing so, we contribute not only to the literature on organizational reputation, but 
also follow a recent trend and explore the micro-foundations of strategic management concepts 
(e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; Felin and Foss, 2005; Teece, 2007). We unpack what has been referred to as 
the favorability (Rindova, Petkova, and Kotha, 2007) or the perceived quality (e.g., Rindova et al., 
2005) aspect of organizational reputation. We focus specifically on the favorability aspect because 
much organizational research on reputations has been concerned with the organizational 
consequences of favorability. We suggest that stakeholders make distinctions between the 
favorability of an organization’s capabilities (i.e., capability reputation) and its character (i.e., 
character reputation), explain the nature and function of each, and articulate the manner in which 
social judgment processes manifest in the development of each type of reputation. We then develop 
testable propositions regarding the manner in which the two types of reputations are built or 
damaged, how managers can enhance or protect their firm’s reputations, and then discuss the 
theoretical and practical implications of our theorizing. 
TWO TYPES OF REPUTATIONS 
Organizational reputation is defined as the collective, stakeholder group-specific assessment 
regarding an organization’s capability to create value based on its characteristics and qualities (e.g., 
Rindova et al., 2005; Rindova et al., 2007). Reputation, developed through both direct and vicarious 
observation of organizational characteristics, actions, and outcomes (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), is used as a cognitive shorthand by stakeholder 
groups to make inferences about organizations when more specific information is either unavailable 
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or too costly to obtain (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). Reputations 
serve an important function by helping stakeholders gauge the probable outcomes of interacting 
with a particular organization (for reviews see e.g., Stiglitz, 2000; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). We 
restrict our theorizing to stakeholder-specific evaluations because organizations may have very 
different reputations with respect to different stakeholder groups (Carter and Deephouse, 1999). We 
make the assumption, however, that individual members of a stakeholder group (e.g., consumers of 
a particular organization) notice similar types of cues, react in a similar manner toward those cues, 
and hence arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Stakeholders make two primary types of reputational assessments when evaluating a target 
organization: what the organization can do (i.e., its abilities and resources) and what the organization 
would likely do (i.e., its goals and behavioral intentions). These two types of reputational assessments 
have been consistently shown to be the two fundamental dimensions of social perception and 
judgment in social psychological research, regardless of whether the target of the evaluation is an 
individual, a group, or even a nation (e.g., Abele and Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et al., 
2005; Wojciszke, 1994). Although a variety of labels have been used to refer to these dimensions, we 
will refer to them as organizational capability and character reputations in this manuscript. The first, 
capability reputations, are collective evaluations about the quality and performance characteristics of 
a particular firm (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1982, 1983; Spence, 1974). The second, 
character reputations, are collective judgments regarding a firm’s incentive structures and behavioral 
tendencies based on observations of its prior actions (e.g., Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982; Rosenthal, 1981). It is important to note that character reputations are not simply 
about incentive structures, but rather about the imputation that stakeholder groups make about the 
target organization’s goals, preferences, and organizational values (e.g., Love and Kraatz, 2009). 
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These imputations, in turn, are used by stakeholders to make behavioral predictions and determine 
whether the target organization’s goals and values are congruent with their own. 
Capability and character reputations enable stakeholders to better deal with the two 
fundamental uncertainties they face in their interactions with an organization. The first type of 
uncertainty is that stemming from the inability to directly observe the characteristics (e.g., quality or 
capability) of the firm or its products before entering into any type of exchange. This includes what 
the economics literature refers to as adverse selection (e.g., Stiglitz, 2000) or a “lemons” problem 
(Akerlof, 1970), whereby there is potential for overpaying for that product or service. In more 
competitive interactions, a lack of information about a rival’s capabilities can lead to underestimation 
or overestimation of an opponent’s competitive capabilities (see also e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, and 
Tsai, 2007). Capability reputations can be useful in these types of situations because they can be used 
as proxies for underlying firm or product characteristics, and provide some guidance on whether 
one should select a different transaction partner, take corrective action through price adjustment, or 
make different competitive moves. 
The second type of uncertainty that stakeholders can face is uncertainty over an 
organization’s behaviors. This includes what the economics literature refers to as a moral hazard 
problem (e.g., Stiglitz, 2000). Moral hazard problems can manifest when a stakeholder faces the 
possibility of being exploited or treated unfairly because they are unable to directly observe the 
behavior of a transaction partner and there exist incentives for that partner to engage in 
opportunistic behavior (e.g., Arrow, 1971). Because character reputations involve imputations of an 
organization’s goals, preferences and values (e.g., Love and Kraatz, 2009), stakeholder groups use 
character reputations to predict not just opportunistic behavior, but also a host of other behaviors. 
For example, customers may use an organization’s character reputation to gauge the likelihood that 
it will produce goods in third-world countries to circumvent labor or environmental regulations. 
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Transaction partners may use character reputations to predict the willingness of the firm to ensure 
timely delivery of products, resolve problems and fix mistakes at its own expense. Employees may 
use the firm’s character reputation as an indicator of whether or not the firm will use layoffs as a 
first response to financial difficulties or if the firm would use it only as a means of last resort.2 In 
competitive interactions, uncertainty regarding a rival’s intentions can make it difficult to predict 
when they might try to enter one’s home market or when initiation of a competitive move, such as a 
price cut, might lead to a retaliatory reaction. Character reputations can be useful in these types of 
situations because they can provide insight into what a firm might do in a particular situation, and 
thereby help firms avoid opportunistic transaction partners and identify circumstances that may 
require additional monitoring or incentive-alignment (e.g., Stiglitz, 2000; see also Fama, 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975). In the following section, we review the literatures on social 
judgment and impression formation from social psychology and describe how they differentially 
apply to judgments about character and capabilities. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND IMPRESSON 
FORMATION 
Research on social judgment and impression formation examines the ways in which individuals 
interpret and internalize information to evaluate others. This research is particularly applicable to the 
study of reputational assessments for three reasons. First, because reputations are collectively held 
judgments, the processes by which individuals form judgments have significant relevance in 
explaining how reputations form and change. Second, research in this area has long emphasized the 
differential impact of judgment biases on the types of assessments that are made, and thus are well 
positioned to address differences between reputational assessments of capability and character. 
Finally, individuals have a tendency to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents and objects (see e.g., 
                                                 
2 We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for suggesting these examples. 
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Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo, 2007 for a review), including organizations (e.g., Love and Kraatz, 
2009). Hence, the same sorts of judgment heuristics and decision biases that impact assessments of 
individuals are also likely to color how organizations are evaluated.  
This research has demonstrated that two mechanisms have a major impact on how social 
judgments are made. First, social judgments appear to be path-dependent (see e.g., Arthur, 1989; 
David, 1985), where prior beliefs determine both what is noticed and how a particular cue might be 
interpreted (e.g., Darley and Fazio, 1980; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Merton, 1948; Srull and Wyer, 
1979, 1980, 1989). Second, the diagnosticity of the cue determines how it will be incorporated to 
adjust the evaluation, depending on whether the cue is positively or negatively discrepant3 with 
respect to prior beliefs (e.g., Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989; Wojciszke et al., 1993). We 
discuss both of these mechanisms in more detail below. 
Path dependence. Social judgments are path-dependent (e.g., Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) in that 
the prior beliefs about the focal dimension influence what observers expect and notice, as well as 
how actions and statements will be interpreted (e.g., Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Srull and Wyer, 1979, 
1980). Path dependence affects judgments by leading observers to interpret equivocal cues as 
confirming their initial expectations, react in such a way as to induce confirmatory actions on the 
part of the target being assessed, and/or attribute disconfirming cues to situational factors (e.g., 
Darley and Fazio, 1980; Merton, 1948). This effect is likely as observers strive to maintain evaluative 
consistency regarding the targets of their judgments (e.g., Coovert and Reeder, 1990; Srull and Wyer, 
1979, 1980, 1989). For example, in his description of the “Matthew Effect,” Merton (1968) argued 
that as scientists gain renown, they are able to derive greater rewards than lower-status scientists for 
                                                 
3 For example, a cue that implies that the organization may possess stronger performance capabilities than the existing 
assessment would indicate would be considered a positively discrepant, or “positive” capability cue. Similarly, a cue that 
implies that the organization may possess weaker performance capabilities than the existing assessment would indicate 
would be considered a negatively discrepant, or “negative” capability cue. 
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equivalent work. This is because observers expect high-status scientists to pursue important 
problems and maintain rigorous standards. This, in turn, also increases the likelihood that observers 
will pay more attention to the work produced by high-status scientists because they expect the work 
to be of higher quality. Similar effects have been demonstrated at the organizational level in such 
contexts as law school rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007) and wineries (Benjamin and Podolny, 
1999). Path dependence is not likely to play a role if no prior belief exist or if the beliefs are neutral 
or ambivalent, but if an observer has any prior beliefs about a target, whether through observation, 
inference or direct interaction, those beliefs will shape the subsequent assessments about that target.  
Cue diagnosticity. Once an observer interprets the meaning of a cue, it and other cues about a 
target are combined through a process of cognitive algebra to form an overall assessment (see e.g., 
Anderson, 1974 for a review). However, certain cues are given greater weight than others (e.g., 
Hodges, 1974), and thus certain cues will have a greater impact on the overall evaluation of a target 
than other cues. In particular, the diagnostic weight that is given to a particular cue depends on the 
type of assessment that it is relevant to and the positivity/negativity of the cue. 
When considering a target’s competence and ability, positive cues are given greater weight 
than negative cues. This is because a positive cue about competence, such as the accomplishment of 
a goal or the performance of a task, demonstrates that the individual actually possesses the ability to 
perform at that level and thus is perceived to have greater diagnostic value (e.g., Skowronski and 
Carlston, 1987, 1989; Wojciszke et al., 1993). In contrast, a cue indicating an inability to accomplish a 
goal or failure to perform at a particular level, tends to be given less diagnostic weight because these 
outcomes can be attributed to situational characteristics or lack of motivation or effort (e.g., 
Anderson and Butzin, 1974; Surber, 1984). 
 The reverse is true when considering a target’s behavioral tendencies. In this case, negative 
cues are viewed as more diagnostic and thus given greater weight than positive cues (e.g., 
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Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989; Wojciszke et al., 1993). This is because positive cues, such as 
good behavior, may merely be an indication of conformance with societal expectations and norms, 
thereby conveying relatively ambiguous or equivocal information about underlying attributes (e.g., 
Birnbaum, 1972; Hamilton and Huffman, 1971; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972). As a result, positive 
cues may be considered the baseline—what is societally expected, making negative cues particularly 
salient as a deviation from the norm and seemingly much more diagnostic of the true underlying 
character of the target being evaluated. 
Taken together, these mechanisms provide a compelling motivation for engaging social 
psychological theories of judgment formation to demonstrate how different types of reputational 
assessments are made. From this literature, it becomes apparent that the type of attribute being 
judged, the historical assessment of the organization along that attribute, and the valence in the 
discrepancy of the cue are all likely to influence how an organization is viewed by a particular 
stakeholder group. In the following section we detail how a cue will impact an organization’s 
capability or character reputation. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of our overall model of how 
cues influence reputational assessments. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT BIASES AND FIRM REPUTATIONS 
A given cue will have potential implications for a firm’s capability, character, or both. If the cue has 
potential implications for only one dimension, then it will be interpreted through the lens of the 
relevant prior assessment (i.e., existing capability or character reputation). On the other hand, if the 
cue has potential implications for both types of reputations, the prior beliefs that are called forth will 
depend on the dimension that is most relevant to the evaluator’s goals with respects to the 
organization (e.g., Abele and Wojciszke, 2007; Wojciszke, 1994; 2005). This does not necessarily 
mean that each evaluator will use idiosyncratic goal calculations, but rather that the nature of the 
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evaluator’s relationship to the target organization will make certain aspects of the organization more 
salient to them than others. 
For example, while current and potential customers might care most about an organization’s 
ability to produce high quality products; current and potential employees might be primarily 
interested in the organization’s trustworthiness; analysts and investors, the financial health of the 
organization; and competitors, the organization’s research and development capabilities. In this 
example, customers, analysts, investors, and competitors may be on the lookout for capability-
relevant cues and use the organization’s existing capability reputation to interpret cues, while 
employees may be particularly attentive to character-relevant cues and use the organization’s existing 
character reputation to interpret subsequent cues.  
If the evaluator determines that the cue is not actually relevant to the dimension of primary 
interest, however, the cue may then be interpreted through the other dimension. Prior studies have 
found that evaluators treat each cue as being relevant to only a single dimension even when the cue 
could have been potentially interpreted as having implications for both types of assessments (e.g., 
Wojciszke, 1994; 2005). As a result, it is likely that the only time both dimensions will be invoked in 
the interpretation of a given cue is when the cue is initially considered in relation to the primary 
dimension, but then discarded as not relevant to that dimension.  
The prior beliefs that stakeholders hold about the capability or character of a focal 
organization provide a lens through which to interpret subsequent cues (e.g., Starbuck and Milliken, 
1988), thereby making certain types of attributions more plausible than others. In particular, 
observers try to form a unitary, consistent impression whenever possible (Coovert and Reeder, 
1990), and thus they use existing reputations to determine what the most plausible interpretation for 
a given cue is likely to be. Only a cue that is discrepant with the existing reputation, and thus 
implying that the current reputation may be too high or too low, will trigger a process of 
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sensemaking (e.g., Weick, 1979; 1995) by which stakeholders try to determine exactly how the cue 
should impact their reputational assessment of the organization.  
Although there can be numerous types of situations in which a discrepant cue would be 
evaluated in light of existing reputations, we address the role of three different factors on 
reputational revision: the type of discrepancy (positive or negatively discrepant), the type of 
reputation (character vs. capability), and the favorability of the existing reputation (favorable vs. 
unfavorable). In general, we argue that the magnitude of a discrepant cue will be positively 
associated with the impact that cue has on a firm’s reputation, such that larger, more discrepant cues 
will tend to cause greater revisions of a firm’s reputation. However, in one case, that of negative 
character cues, theory suggests that that these linear effects may not be appropriate, and instead, a 
firm’s prior reputation may interact with cue magnitude to influence the impact of negative character 
cues. We take the degree of discrepancy as a given in all other cases and make an assumption that 
the impacts will be amplified or dampened based on the magnitude of the discrepancy between the 
cue and the existing reputation. For ease of discussion, we refer to positively and negatively 
discrepant cues as positive and negative cues, and capability-relevant and character-relevant cues as 
capability and character cues from this point forward. We begin by examining the impact of the type of 
discrepancy on capability reputations and discuss the expected differences in effects for firms with a 
favorable versus an unfavorable capability reputation. 
Cue diagnosticity and firm reputation for capability 
Based on our earlier discussion about assessments of cue diagnosticity, we argue that a positive 
capability cue will be considered to be more diagnostic than a negative one (Skowronski and 
Carlston, 1987, 1989). As a result, a positive capability cue will tend to have a more a powerful 
influence on reputational adjustment than a negative cue. This is because the most convincing 
evidence of a firm’s ability to create high levels of value is that firm’s historical accomplishments. 
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Once a firm has demonstrated its ability to perform at a high level, future evaluations take such 
performance as a given, and stakeholders will believe that the firm is capable of creating a similar 
level of value. Consequently, a positive capability cue is given great credence as being indicative of 
the firm’s full potential, whereas a cue indicating lower levels of capability may be attributed to other 
factors, such as poor execution or hostile environmental conditions, rather than changes in 
underlying potential (e.g., Anderson and Butzin, 1974; Surber, 1984). This leads to our first 
proposition: 
P1: A positive capability cue will have a stronger influence on a firm’s reputation for capability than a 
negative capability cue of the same magnitude. 
Path dependency and firm reputation for capability 
Since cues are interpreted based on prior beliefs (e.g., Starbuck and Milliken, 1988), the effects of a 
positive capability cue will tend to be moderated by the firm’s existing capability reputation. The 
existing reputation primes evaluators to look for confirmatory or consistent cues, interpret 
ambiguous cues as confirming the initial expectation, and generally use prior reputation to simplify 
complicated information (e.g., Darley and Fazio, 1980; Espeland and Sauder, 2007). Additionally, 
actors who have gained renown for their accomplishments tend to be given greater credit for any 
subsequent accomplishment than those without such renown (Merton, 1968). For example, Pfarrer, 
Pollock, and Rindova (2010) found that investors reacted more favorably to positive earnings 
surprises of high reputation firms relative to firms without a high reputation. Similarly, in the 
California wine industry, Benjamin and Podolny found that high-status wineries were able to 
command higher prices for a given quality of wine because the firm’s status influenced how much 
attention others paid “to quality, assessment of quality, and their regard for the product more 
generally” (1999: 585)4. The implication, then, is that an existing capability reputation that is 
                                                 
4 While status is conceptually distinct from reputation, Podolny (1993, 1994) notes that status is compatible with the 
economic notion of reputation because both act as proxies for quality. For more specific distinctions between reputation 
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favorable is likely to increase the likelihood that a positive capability cue will be noticed, as well as 
the amount of weight that will be given to that cue, and thus an organization with a favorable 
existing reputation is apt to enjoy greater reputational gains from a given positive capability cue than 
one with a less favorable existing capability reputation. These ideas are summarized in the 
proposition below. 
P2a: A positive capability cue from a firm with a more favorable reputation for capability will have a greater 
influence on a firm’s reputation for capability than a positive capability cue of the same magnitude from a 
firm with a less favorable reputation for capability. 
In contrast to the strong adjustment potential of a positive capability cue for a capability 
reputation, the influence of a negative capability cue is likely to be minimal, and potentially 
dependent on the prior evaluations of the firm. As noted earlier, a negative capability cue, such as 
the inability to accomplish a goal or failure to perform at a particular level, tends to be given less 
diagnostic weight because these outcomes can be attributed to situational characteristics or lack of 
motivation or effort (e.g., Anderson and Butzin, 1974; Surber, 1984). At the firm level, an incident 
of poor performance may be explained through external attributions (e.g., a “bad economy” or 
higher input prices), in which case it may be viewed as a temporary blip or “noise” that is not likely 
to be indicative of the firm’s true capabilities. If a plausible external attribution is not available, a 
negative capability cue may be given an internal attribution. Here too, the types of internal 
attributions made may include non-capability factors, such as a change in organizational priorities or 
a lack of employee effort and motivation. 
As with positive capability cues, the reputational impact of a negative cue is likely to also 
depend on the prior beliefs that evaluators hold about the target organization’s capability. Just as 
prior demonstrations of high levels of performance may make a subsequent positive capability cue 
                                                                                                                                                             
and status, see for example Deephouse and Suchman (2008), Devers and colleagues (2009), Jensen and Roy (2008), 
and/or Washington and Zajac (2005). 
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more credible, such displays are also more likely to lead evaluators to conclude that a negative 
capability cue is not the result of declining organizational capabilities and instead due to other 
explanations. For example, for many years Microsoft launched new versions of its internet browser 
(Internet Explorer) that were technologically inferior to others on the market (Klein, 2001). 
Evaluators in the media saw this not as a sign of Microsoft’s inability to produce a strong product, 
but that, in light of the company’s strong market position (Parr, 2009), it instead indicated 
Microsoft’s weak motivation (MacDonald, 2000) to keep on the technological forefront. As this 
example illustrates, a negative capability cue for firms with favorable reputations for capability will 
be seen as less diagnostic of a firm’s true capabilities. This is summarized in the proposition below. 
P2b: A negative capability cue from a firm with a more favorable reputation for capability will have a lesser 
influence on a firm’s reputation for capability than a negative capability cue of the same magnitude from a 
firm with a less favorable reputation for capability. 
Cue diagnosticity and firm reputation for character 
In contrast to the strong reputational impact that a positive capability cue may have, a positive 
character cue tends to be viewed as having weak diagnostic value and thus has a very limited 
influence on a stakeholder’s evaluation. As noted earlier, because “good behavior” is considered 
normatively appropriate, a cue that provides evidence of such conforming behavior is expected 
regardless of what the target organization’s true underlying character might be (Birnbaum, 1972; 
Hamilton and Huffman, 1971; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972). For example, one might consider the 
situation of a traditional American gas station that sells $1 window stickers to customers to raise 
money for the March of Dimes, American Cancer Society, or some other worthy cause. Although 
this type of behavior is commendable, and generally well-respected, such positive cues are unlikely 
to change the reputational evaluations that stakeholders hold about the gas station. It is unlikely that 
many customers would change their buying behavior to support such a gas station substantially 
more, or that such gas stations would be recognized by outside groups for their efforts. Instead, 
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these cues are viewed as positive conforming behavior that provides little information about the 
organization’s true character. Hence, even when a target firm provides evidence of good behavior, 
its diagnostic value for determining an organization’s true character and intentions can be rather 
limited (e.g., Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989). In contrast to positive character cues, we 
suggest that a negative character cue will be viewed as highly diagnostic. Since positive character 
cues are societally expected, a negative character cue tends to be jarring and noticeable, and as such 
will be viewed by evaluators as particularly revealing of the core and essential nature of the target 
due to their norm-discrepant nature (e.g., Hamilton and Huffman, 1971; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972; 
Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989). In essence, stakeholders will tend to assume that, because 
most organizations will not want to unnecessarily alienate them, only truly shady firms would do 
shady things. Together this is summarized in the following proposition: 
P3: A negative character cue will have a stronger influence on a firm’s reputation for character than a positive 
character cue of the same magnitude. 
Path dependency and firm reputation for character 
We argue that path dependency is also likely to moderate the influence of a character cue. Although 
all positive behavioral indicators are viewed as weakly diagnostic of a firm’s true character, this is 
likely to be further exacerbated if a firm has a less-favorable character reputation. Not only is a 
positive character cue only weakly diagnostic to begin with (Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989), 
but from a firm with a lesser reputation, such an indicator is also likely to be viewed with suspicion 
and distrust by evaluators because the expectation is that questionable firms will behave in a 
questionable manner (Fombrun, 1996). As a result, evaluators will suspect that ulterior motives may 
be behind the positive character cue, and thus such a cue will have a weak influence on the resultant 
character evaluation.  
One illustrative example is the case of Wal-Mart, which has been the target of criticism for 
quite some time regarding their labor practices. Some stakeholders view Wal-Mart as having a 
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problematic value system that prioritizes profitability over the wellbeing of their employees and local 
communities (e.g., Dube, Lester, and Eidlin, 2007; Mui, 2009). Although Wal-Mart has recently been 
heavily involved in becoming environmentally conscious (e.g., Aston, 2009), it appears that 
unfavorable beliefs about their value systems have made it difficult to get credit for these 
environmental actions. Instead, because the existing belief is that Wal-Mart cares only about 
corporate profits, these efforts have been met with indifference or active distrust by stakeholders 
who view these actions not as indicators of concern about environmental sustainability, but instead 
as a means to distract attention from labor issues (msnbc.com news services, 2005) or the ways in 
which its business practices have and continue to actively contribute to environmental degradation 
(Wal-Mart Watch, 2007). As this example illustrates, these dynamics imply that a firm with an 
existing unfavorable reputation for character may find it difficult or even impossible to fully 
overcome such an evaluation and achieve a favorable character reputation, even when sending 
strong signals that could otherwise be interpreted as indicating positive character. This idea is 
summarized in the following proposition. 
P4a: A positive character cue from a firm with a less favorable reputation for character will have a lesser 
influence on a firm’s reputation for character than a positive character cue of the same magnitude from a firm 
with a more favorable reputation for character.  
Path dependence may also have further influences on stakeholder evaluations. First, a 
potentially negative character cue is likely to be interpreted differently for firms with highly favorable 
existing reputations for character. Because evaluators filter cues through their current view of the 
firm, the presumption is that organizations that have earned a favorable character reputation in the 
past will behave in a reliable, credible, trustworthy, and responsible manner (e.g., Fombrun, 1996; 
Love and Kraatz, 2009). For these organizations, a potentially negative character cue may be given 
an external attribution for some weak cues (e.g., bad luck) or be treated as an accident.  
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As Bromberg and Fine have noted, a highly favorable reputation may make certain 
incongruous behaviors and cues “invisible” (2002: 1151) because they do not fit the representations 
currently held by audiences. Similar arguments have been made in several different literatures. For 
instance, classic research in social psychology has found that well-accepted actors gain “idiosyncrasy 
credits” that build up by demonstrating competence in accordance with group expectations 
(Hollander, 1958). These credits can then be used to maintain standing in a group or with peers 
when the actor deviates from accepted practice, as a sort of built up “slack” for bad behavior. At the 
organizational level, favorable judgments about a firm’s character may provide an organization with 
“good will” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) that provides it with some amount of slack, such that 
contradictory negative cues are, at least initially, treated by stakeholders with some skepticism and 
the firm is given the benefit of the doubt. Hence, the cue may be attributed to external situational 
factors or, even if it is given an internal attribution, it may be minimized by treating it as a result of 
unintentional processes or unforeseen accidents.  
Consistent with this notion, consumers were more willing to give a firm with a good 
reputation the benefit of the doubt when making inferences about underlying motive for pricing 
actions, thereby suggesting that reputations can be used to “gain greater leniency from consumers 
and soften consumers’ reactions to firms’ actions” (Campbell, 1999: 190). Similarly, the literature on 
accounts and excuses (e.g., Scott and Lyman, 1968) has found that the explanations provided by 
highly regarded offenders are more likely to be positively viewed and internally accepted than those 
provided by lower-status offenders (Blumstein et al., 1974; Massy, Freeman and Zelditch, 1997). 
Indeed, in some instances, high-status actors may not even be required to provide an explanation 
because their high moral character shields them from the necessity (Scott and Lyman, 1968). 
Although a highly favorable perception of organizational character may initially provide a 
buffer from the consequences of a negative cue, the magnitude of the cue plays an important role in 
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these judgments. In fact, the literature explicitly considers the asymmetric effects of magnitude, and 
argues that such slack is likely to be provided to only the most favorably viewed firms and for very 
minor transgressions. Specifically, Hollander (1958) notes that idiosyncrasy credits are not entirely 
durable, but simply provide room for some deviance. As such, multiple contradictory negative cues or 
a negative cue of significant magnitude will result in a rapid and substantial decline in organizational 
character reputation.  
This leads us to a second potential influence of path-dependent bias in the evaluation of a 
negative cue for firms with favorable character reputations. When a negative cue breaks through the 
goodwill levels of idiosyncrasy credits, the consequences will be severe. In these cases, the character 
cue is not considered in isolation, but instead the overall evaluation of the organization may be 
reorganized to be consistent (Reeder and Coovert, 1986), such that even previous cues may be re-
evaluated in light of the new information. Research in sociology offers similar evidence: Ducharme 
and Fine (1995) found that, after his infamous betrayal of the U.S. during the Revolutionary War, 
Benedict Arnold’s entire personal history was reinterpreted by the public. Despite being hailed as a 
war hero and military leader early in his career, the public recast Arnold’s prior successes as lucky 
coincidences and his acts of heroism as nefarious attempts to maximize the devastating impact of his 
eventual treason (Ducharme and Fine, 1995). Taken together, these two additional elements of path 
dependency moderation are summarized in the propositions below. 
P4b: A weak negative character cue from a firm with a more favorable reputation for character will have a 
lesser influence on a firm’s reputation for character than a weak negative character cue of the same magnitude 
from a firm with a less favorable reputation for character.  
P4c: A moderate to strong negative character cue from a firm with a more favorable reputation for character 
will have a greater influence on the firm’s character reputation than a moderate to strong cue of the same 
magnitude from a firm with a less favorable reputation for character.  
TRANSLATING BIASES INTO MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGERIAL ACTION 
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The preceding propositions focused on how stakeholder groups would adjust their reputational 
assessments in response to new cues, thereby changing the firm’s reputation. This does not mean, 
however, that a firm’s reputation is determined and controlled completely by its stakeholders or that 
managers can not shape their organization’s reputation. By explicitly considering how cues are 
differentially interpreted and weighted, we offer insights as to how managers may better focus their 
efforts and resources when attempting to enhance and protect their firm’s reputation. In particular, 
our arguments have direct implications for: strategic cue generation to improve the firm’s reputation 
and firm impression management strategies to protect the firm’s reputation from negative cues that 
have not yet been fully incorporated into the reputation. We detail our arguments and present 
formal propositions for each in the following sections. 
Strategic cue generation to build a favorable reputation 
A great deal of organizational time and effort is devoted to the strategic generation of cues in order 
to build a favorable firm reputation. It is important to note that an organization’s decision to 
generate a specific cue does not ensure that that the cue will necessarily be noticed by external 
observers or incorporated into subsequent reputational assessments. Nonetheless, they can be an 
effective way of shaping the firm’s reputational trajectory. Building on the arguments leading to 
propositions one through four, the implications of stakeholder judgment biases for such strategic 
cue generation vary dramatically between capability and character cues.  
When building a capability reputation, we argue that a firm should attempt to generate cues 
that involve demonstrable and measurable indications of the highest performance of which the 
organization is capable. Positive capability cues demonstrate that the firm actually possesses the 
ability to perform at a high level, and thus are perceived to have greater diagnostic value (e.g., 
Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989; Wojciszke et al., 1993). As such, all subsequent cues will tend 
to be evaluated in light of the highest level of performance attained by an organization. 
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Consequently, executives seeking to build a strong capability reputation for the firm should focus on 
generating a single strong cue to demonstrate firm capabilities. For example, at major international 
auto shows, top car manufacturers will often reveal what are known as “concept cars” (Joseph, 
2009). Many of these concept cars will never actually reach the production stage, but instead are 
intended to demonstrate to top rating organizations, media outlets, and consumers what the 
organization is truly capable of creating. As another example, Hyundai, a manufacturer typically 
regarded in the marketplace as a maker of lower-end vehicles, has recently released a new high-end 
model called the “Equus.” In explaining the car to the media, the CEO of Hyundai America noted, 
“we have just two key goals in mind for Equus: show the world we can build a flagship sedan that 
rivals Lexus LS, BMW 7 Series and Mercedes-Benz S-Class, and in so doing build further confidence 
in the Hyundai brand with a broad audience of car buyers” (Krafcik, 2010). Reflecting the likelihood 
that this high-end model was more of a symbolic show of strength than a substantive new product 
launch, Hyundai will only be producing about three thousand these high end cars each year (Ulrich, 
2010).  
These illustrations stand in contrast to the practice of earnings management, where firms use 
accrual accounting to smooth or manage earnings with the belief that stability in earnings is desirable 
(see e.g., Dechow and Skinner, 2000 for a review). The idea here is that both gains and losses will be 
spread over several quarters to avoid both peaks and troughs in the firm’s earnings. Contrary to the 
practice of earnings management, our theorizing would suggest that, given the choice of spreading 
earnings gains over several quarters and having a consistent stream of capability cues or of having a 
single quarter of extremely high earnings, a firm should do the latter if the goal was to have 
maximum impact on the firm’s capability reputation. Of course, this does presume that the firm’s 
primary concern is with reputational issues, since such a spike in performance may have other 
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unintended negative effects as well (e.g., Mishina et al., 2010). These ideas come together to support 
the following proposition.  
P5: A firm that generates a single strong positive capability cue will create a greater improvement in 
capability reputation than will a firm that generates a consistent stream of moderate to weak positive 
capability cues. 
In contrast, our arguments regarding cue diagnosticity biases in evaluating organizational 
character suggest that the weak diagnosticity of positive character cues supports a strategy that 
emphasizes a consistent stream of cues rather than one frame breaking cue. Given that good 
behavior is expected in society, a single positive character cue will have little effect on evaluative 
judgments as it simply suggests conformance with typical norms, providing little information about 
underlying firm values (Birnbaum, 1972; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972). As a result, it takes a pattern 
of behavior, reinforced over time, to build a strong positive character reputation, with firms judged 
particularly for the consistency of their track record and efforts (Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, and Taylor, 
2008). This suggests that firms that would like to reap the benefits of a strong positive character 
reputation should make significant efforts to create a consistent, even if somewhat symbolic or 
manufactured, stream of cues, regardless of magnitude, to build a pattern. This leads to the 
following proposition. 
P6: A firm that generates a consistent stream of moderate to weak positive character cues will create a greater 
improvement in character reputation than will a firm that generates a single strong positive character cue. 
Impression management strategies to protect a reputation 
Social judgment biases can also provide insight into how firms should respond to negative cues that 
have not yet been fully incorporated into the reputation. Firms often use impression management in 
response to negative cues as a way to manage stakeholder perceptions and evaluations (e.g., Arndt 
and Bigelow, 2000; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Although researchers have examined a variety of 
specific tactics, these tactics generally fall into one of two different categories: techniques to amplify 
21 
 
positive cues about the organization and those that minimize or obfuscate the negative cues about 
the organization. Although firms will often employ both amplifying and minimizing techniques, they 
are unlikely to be equally effective (Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 1993) or appropriate in all 
circumstances. As such, considering the dynamics of social judgment biases can provide insights as 
to when these techniques can be employed effectively.  
We argue that the effectiveness of the impression management techniques deployed will vary 
depending on the type of negative cue. For negative capability cues, we argue that the firm should 
deploy impression management techniques that amplify positive cues about its capability rather than 
focus their efforts on dampening the negative cue. In the previous section we discussed the 
importance of demonstrating the outer bounds of the organization’s capabilities, and based on our 
earlier discussion about the diagnosticity of cues (Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989), we argue 
that positive capability cues will tend to have a more powerful influence on reputations for capability 
than the negative ones. By pointing to convincing and quantifiable evidence of a firm’s historical 
ability to create value, organizational managers can remind stakeholders that the organization has, in 
fact, reached such levels of ability and increase the likelihood that the inconsistent, negative 
capability cue will be attributed to external or situational factors.  
P7: Impression management efforts directed towards amplifying prior positive capability cues will be more 
effective in protecting a firm’s capability reputation than efforts focused on dampening negative cues. 
In contrast, we suggest that for negative character cues, amplifying the firm’s prior good 
deeds may not be enough to repair perceptions of the firm’s character. This is because, even for 
firms with favorable prior character reputations, one strong negative character cue may be enough to 
reorganize and reframe the organization’s entire history (Reeder and Coovert, 1986; Ducharme and 
Fine, 1995). In addition, given the diagnosticity and stickiness of negative character cues 
(Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989) firms are unlikely to be able to rely solely on their stored up 
good will (Hollander, 1958) from past behaviors to combat the negative character cues. Instead, a 
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more effective approach would be to direct their efforts and resources towards minimizing and 
obfuscating the negative cues. This may involve undermining the source of the cue, blocking its 
wide dissemination, and altering the meaning or significance of the cue. The key under this 
circumstance is to make the cue disappear as quickly as possible before it can do significant damage. 
P8: Impression management efforts directed towards dampening the negative cues will be more effective in 
protecting a firm’s character reputation than efforts focused on amplifying prior positive character cues. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The goal of this paper was to investigate the socio-cognitive processes through which reputational 
assessments are made and altered. We distinguished between two types of reputations that 
stakeholders utilize in their interactions with other organizations and drew upon research on 
judgment biases to examine how organizational capability and character reputations are differentially 
built and damaged. Our theorizing extends research on organizational reputations by providing 
unique insights into how firms can better build and manage their reputations.  
Theoretical implications 
This research has several theoretical implications for future work on organizational reputation. First, 
we begin to disentangle what Rindova and colleagues have dubbed the favorability component of 
reputation (e.g., Rindova et al., 2005, 2007) into two types—favorability about an organization’s 
character and favorability about an organization’s capability. Distinguishing between the two 
fundamentally distinct types of reputational assessments made by stakeholder groups is particularly 
important because social judgment biases and heuristics affect the two types of reputation in 
different ways, different strategies are effective for enhancing or protecting each type, and because 
the two types of reputation are likely to be relevant in different situations.  
Our research also underscores the need to integrate the notion of character reputation more 
explicitly into research on organizational reputation. Although quality- and performance-related 
reputation has been well-studied as a resource (e.g., Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Srivastava et al., 
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1997), there may be a significant opportunity to contribute to the reputational literature by exploring 
character-based advantages that emerge as an intangible resource for firms. Our theorizing suggests 
that a character reputation may be precisely the type of organizational resource that can provide 
firms with a sustainable competitive advantage (Hall, 1993), because it is likely to be subject to both 
time compression diseconomies and asset mass efficiencies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989: 1507-1509). 
Specifically, because negative character cues are considered more diagnostic than positive cues (e.g., 
Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989), building a favorable character reputation is likely to require a 
consistent stream of positive character cues over time (Pfarrer et al., 2008) and would be difficult to 
build quickly. Additionally, since the assumption is that questionable firms will behave in 
questionable ways (Fombrun, 1996), firms with a more favorable character reputation will find it 
easier to further enhance their character reputation than would firms with a less favorable character 
reputation. Exploring how and why different types of firms are able to exploit their character 
reputations to position themselves in the marketplace is a potential direction for future research. 
This paper also begins to integrate insights from social psychology with the organizational 
reputation literature in order to better understand the ways reputations form and decline. In doing 
this, we follow Stiglitz’s (2000: 1471) suggestion to draw upon research in psychology to determine 
how “individuals process information, form expectations, and select among possible signals.” This 
approach has also enabled us to begin exploring the micro-foundations of organizational reputation, 
similar to the type of work recent scholars have done on various types of capabilities (e.g., Ethiraj et 
al., 2005; Felin and Foss, 2005; Teece, 2007). While these scholars have examined the individual-
level actions and interactions that may result in the formation and utilization of capabilities, we 
explored how individual-level social judgment biases may impact the formation and utilization of 
organizational reputations. As our arguments suggest, the joint effects of path dependence and cue 
diagnosticity biases should produce very different patterns of growth and decline for capability 
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versus character reputations, as well as make different tactics effective when trying to enhance or 
protect these reputations. Our work thus takes a first step toward developing theory that is needed 
to disentangle reputation growth, decline, and maintenance in the presence of path dependence and 
judgment heuristics that impose temporal and behavioral constraints on traditional models of 
reputation and reputational management.  
Related to this issue, our work provides a new lens through which to evaluate the potentially 
complex theoretical situation in which a firm could maintain disparate and distinct reputational 
characteristics simultaneously. As an illustration, the ideas from our work could be used to re-
examine a finding from the prior literature. Specifically, Carter and Deephouse (1999) examined how 
Wal-Mart attempted to manage its reputation for being demanding and difficult in their dealings 
with suppliers while providing strong performance and good value to customers and investors. Wal-
Mart’s reputation with suppliers might largely be what we refer to in this paper as a character 
reputation, while its reputation with customers and investors appears to be a capability reputation. 
Our theorizing suggests that it may be difficult to build or maintain a favorable character reputation 
or an unfavorable capability reputation, but building or maintaining a favorable capability reputation 
or an unfavorable character reputation may prove somewhat easier. In this case, Wal-Mart’s existing 
reputation—unfavorable character and favorable capability—and the diagnosticity of both negative 
character cues and positive capability cues (e.g., Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989) imply that 
these two types of reputations would be fairly easy to maintain.  
Further, our theorizing allows us to understand why and how the same cue may have a 
different impact across organizations. Our arguments highlight the importance of a) the type of 
reputation in question (i.e., capability or character), b) the positivity or negativity of the discrepancy 
between the cue and the reputation, c) the magnitude of the discrepancy, and d) the current level of 
the reputation in determining the potential impact of a given cue. If two firms with differing 
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reputations experienced the same cue, the type of reputation that it is relevant will also be identical, 
but two to three of the other important variables are likely to differ across the two cases. We have 
already stated that the current levels of the reputation are different, and thus either or both of the 
variables associated with discrepancy will also be different. Depending on the levels of the 
reputations and the cue, the cue may be positively discrepant with both firms’ reputations, negatively 
discrepant with both, or be positively discrepant with one and negatively discrepant with the other. 
Consequently, the discrepancies may be different in terms of magnitude, valence (i.e., 
positivity/negativity), or both. Our propositions specifically deal with three of these factors directly: 
the type of reputation, positivity/negativity of the discrepancy and the current level of the 
reputation. As for the fourth, the magnitude of the discrepancy, we suggest that the degree to which 
a given cue violates existing stakeholder expectations is likely to amplify or dampen a cue, such that 
larger, more discrepant cues will tend to cause greater revisions of a firm’s reputation. However, 
there is no theoretical basis to predict which of the four factors will have the greatest effect on a 
reputation, and thus more specific predictions will require empirical testing to derive coefficient 
estimates for these factors.  
Finally, our research also highlights the theoretical potential for research on the negative side 
of reputation. Although the “dark side” of reputation has historically received less attention in the 
literature (Hirsch and Pozner, 2005), our arguments provide some foundations and directions for 
pushing further into the dynamics of broken and imperfect firm reputations. Particularly in our 
“translating biases” section, our research begins to scratch the surface of possibilities for theoretical 
and empirical work into firm reputations that are far from productive assets, but are instead 
damaged and disadvantageous. How these firms may manage the generation of reputational cues, 
employ impression management tactics, and position themselves for inter-organizational 
relationships all provide rich theoretical ground for additional research. 
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Future directions  
We believe that our theorizing highlights several opportunities for future research. First, it may be 
useful to examine the different aspects of reputation. Rindova and colleagues (2007) noted that 
reputations can be thought of as having four different aspects: prominence, evaluative favorability, 
descriptive content, and esteem. We opted to focus our examination on the favorability aspect of 
organizational reputations because the impression formation and social judgment literature deal with 
evaluations of favorability and do not speak directly to issues of prominence, descriptive content, or 
esteem; because once an evaluation is made of a target, subsequent behaviors tend to be assessed in 
terms of that evaluation (e.g., Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Srull and Wyer, 1979, 1980, 1989); and 
because much organizational research on reputations has been concerned with the organizational 
consequences of favorability.  
Nonetheless, other aspects of reputation, such as the prominence of the firm, may influence 
our proposed relationships. Prominence refers to the degree to which external audiences are aware 
of an organization and consider it to be relevant and salient (e.g., Rindova et al., 2005, 2007). 
Stakeholders closely monitor and attend to the actions and outcomes of prominent organizations 
(Brooks et al., 2003), and thus are more likely to notice and react to both positive and negative cues 
about the firm. Additionally, because information about prominent firms is more cognitively 
available (e.g., Brooks et al., 2003; Rindova et al., 2005, 2007), existing reputational assessments have 
a greater impact on the interpretation of subsequent cues. The joint effect of these two processes 
might be to amplify the effects that we proposed in our paper, as well as to produce more polarized 
and extreme reputations (e.g., Brooks et al., 2003). However, the exact manner in which prominence 
and the other aspects of reputation will influence one another or how the different aspects of 
reputation will change over time remains an open empirical question. 
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Another possibility for future research would be to examine the relationships between the 
perceptions and evaluations of different members of a stakeholder group. In our paper, we 
developed arguments at the stakeholder-group level, with the assumption that a variety of 
mechanisms will result in similar types of attention and interpretation by the members of the 
stakeholder group. We did so because we believe that collective representations, such as a 
reputation, and individual-level cognitions influence one another over time (e.g., Porac, Ventresca, 
and Mishina, 2002). Thus, industry recipes (Spender, 1989), industry taxonomies (Porac et al., 1995), 
media stories (e.g., Gamson et al., 1992), public measures and rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007), 
the sense-giving efforts of market participants (e.g., Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994), 
and institutional pressures (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) are all likely to influence individual 
schemas, and thus the assessments that individual stakeholders make. These individual assessments, 
in turn, are diffused through the actions, statements, and sensegiving efforts (e.g., Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994) of the stakeholders involved, especially since actors tend to 
observe referent others to determine how to interpret a particular situation and what actions to take 
(e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; White, 1981a, b). Hence, while there may be some variation in 
individual assessments of a particular target organization, we believe that a variety of mechanisms 
will serve to create consensus and reduce the gap between individual assessments and the reputation 
of the firm vis-à-vis the stakeholder group.  
Nonetheless, it is always possible that any individual stakeholder’s assessments may diverge 
from more widely held evaluations of the firm. For example, there may be greater variation in 
assessments if some members of the stakeholder group have direct experience with the firm while 
others have only vicarious information. Assessments may also be more varied for firms that are less 
prominent, as such firms are less cognitively available, and thus not all cues may be noticed by all 
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members of the stakeholder group. Examining when there may be greater or lesser consensus 
regarding assessments of a target organization may be a worthy topic for future study. 
We also chose to focus on stakeholder-specific reputation rather than an aggregate, cross-
stakeholder reputation because we assumed that individual members of a stakeholder group may 
come to a similar evaluation of a particular target but that different categories of stakeholders might 
not. Some have suggested that it is better to conceptualize and examine reputation as specific to a 
stakeholder group (e.g., Carter and Deephouse, 1999; Rindova et al., 2005), while others argue that it 
is much more meaningful to examine reputation as a net assessment across all stakeholders, even if 
different stakeholders have different assessments (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). We 
believe that our theorizing applies to stakeholder-specific reputations, but is less applicable if one is 
discussing an aggregate, cross-stakeholder reputation because many of the assumptions that we 
make are less applicable when discussing a heterogeneous group of stakeholders. 
As Carter and Deephouse (1999) demonstrated, for example, Wal-Mart was viewed in a very 
different way by its suppliers than by its customers and investors. Indeed, although we believe that, 
one can find common evaluations within a particular stakeholder group, how evaluations would 
aggregate across different categories of stakeholders is likely to be highly organization-specific and 
depend on the relative number, influence, and visibility of the different stakeholder groups of each 
organization. Additionally, because different stakeholder groups care about different aspects of the 
firm, they may be differentially vocal and/or influential depending on whether one is discussing 
capability or character reputations. It should be noted that this does not preclude the possibility that, 
in some cases, an organization may be viewed in very similar ways by all of its stakeholders, and in 
some instances, an organization’s reputation with one group of stakeholders may influence how 
other stakeholders evaluate the organization. When and under what condition this is likely to occur 
may be worthy of future study. 
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We also made the assumption that, consistent with prior research, evaluators treat each cue 
as being relevant to only a single dimension even when the cue could have been potentially 
interpreted as having implications for both types of assessments (e.g., Wojciszke, 1994; 2005). We 
thus believe that a firm’s character reputation, for instance, will not have a direct impact on the same 
firm’s capability reputation. Nonetheless, our theorizing does suggest that one type of reputation 
could influence the other type of reputation through a more circuitous route. The more extreme the 
firm’s reputation, whether it be extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable, the more likely that it 
will influence which cues are noticed, what dimension a given cue will be viewed as relevant to, and 
how the cue will be evaluated. Thus, if a firm has a very poor character reputation with respect to a 
particular group of stakeholders, those stakeholders are more likely to notice character-relevant cues 
and interpret cues in light of the existing poor character reputation. Hence, even strong performance 
might be viewed as an indication of poor character rather than favorable capability. For example, the 
recent scandals in the financial services sector have instilled the belief in many people that Wall 
Street banks had problematic value systems and would behave in problematic ways, thereby lowering 
the character reputation of many or most of these banks. Thus, when Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, 
Bank of America, and Citigroup reported having perfect trading quarters (i.e., made money on every 
single day) between January 1 and March 31 of 2010, many immediately began to suggest that this 
was due to market manipulation and nefarious activities rather than skillful trading or shifts in the 
banks’ business practices towards market-making (Ryder, 2010; Weil, 2010). Consequently, although 
the perfect trading quarter could have been treated as a capability cue that demonstrated these firms’ 
market prowess, rightly or wrongly, it seems to have been interpreted as a character cue that 
underscored the inherent shadiness of Wall Street banks. If even performance cues cease to be 
associated with capability, such firms would not only have difficulty in improving their character 
reputations, but also have difficulty in improving their capability reputations. When and under what 
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conditions particular cues begin to lose their association with a given reputational dimension or how 
firms may begin to lose avenues for improving their reputation may thus be an interesting avenue of 
study as well. 
Finally, our theorizing opens up additional avenues for empirical study of reputations. We 
believe that the exact way in which the discrepancies between a cue and a reputation could be 
measured would depend on the empirical context—i.e., specific type of reputation, the type(s) of 
cues, the industry, and the specific stakeholder group, among other things. As such, it is somewhat 
difficult to provide a one-size-fits-all measure. Nonetheless, in thinking about the issue of 
measurement, in some cases, it may be possible to use archival measures, such as ROA or stock 
price, and compare the new cue to prior cues (in terms of discrepancy with the maximum, mean, 
median, and/or minimum) over some time period, such as the past year or past five years, for 
example, in order to get some measure of discrepancy. Alternatively, perhaps independent evaluators 
could provide ratings of perceived discrepancy. For example, Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton (1997) 
provided MBA and executive MBA students with scenario information about different firms in 
order to study how reputations impact decisions about whether or not to engage in a joint venture. 
Maybe a similar design could be used to have participants rate the degree to which particular cues 
(e.g., firm actions) might be discrepant with the information they had been presented about the firm.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we derived a set of propositions from two key insights from the social judgment 
literature—that assessments of capability and character are fundamentally different and that prior 
assessments influence how subsequent information is perceived and interpreted. These propositions 
explain how firm actions and outcomes might translate into reputations and provide guidance as to 
how firms could manage their reputations. In doing so, we have uncovered opportunities yet to be 
explored, including new problems that need attention.  
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Figure 1: Overall model of how cues impact reputational assessments 
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